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     MAKING POPULATIONS APPEAR 
NICK COULDRY 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Reality TV is more than just a series of texts or generic variations. At the very least, reality 
TV needs to be understood as a form whereby objects, mechanisms of representation, and 
people (producers, participants, audiences) are arranged so as to sustain claims - plausible at 
some level - that social ‘reality’ is presented through these means. This social form (in many 
varieties) has persisted for nearly two decades across an ever-expanding range of countries. 
Five years ago, the death of reality TV was widely predicted, yet we are now debating its 
political implications on a global scale. This persistence is not guaranteed into the future, but 
so far it has surprised many, and so too needs explanation. If ‘reality production’ proves an 
enduring social form in late 20th century and early 21st century media - even as media 
interfaces undergo huge transformation - then we need to understand why.  
 
Dominant so far have been explanations that prioritise economic factors and one type of 
political factor (neoliberalism and/or biopolitics). While I will acknowledge those 
explanations’ importance , I will link them to wider dynamics. We need here to separate 
long-term factors from shorter-term, more ‘local’ (and more obviously contingent) factors. 
My wider aim will be to formulate ways of thinking about the phenomenon of reality TV that 
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facilitate international comparative research. In so doing, I will extend aspects of my earlier 
analysis of how media rituals contribute to media’s role in the development of modernity .1 
 
Long-term contexts for interpreting reality TV  
 
Many analysts dismiss the ‘reality’ claims of reality TV, as if the word ‘reality’ was here just 
a dead metaphor. Of course audiences discount such claims, if made explicitly. But that 
doesn’t mean audiences (any more than marketers) treat these claims to ‘reality’ as trivial. As 
recent research by Bev Skeggs, Helen Wood and Nancy Thumim and even more recently by 
Katherine Sender brings out ,2 whether or not people say they discount such ‘reality’ claims 
does not affect whether they act on them, for example, by treating reality shows as sources of 
knowledge or as presenting real moral choices. Authenticity is something people look for in 
reality TV, as Annette Hill’s audience research has brought out.3 Ignoring this cuts us off 
from recognising a wider process of which reality TV is part: the constant, contested but 
generally naturalised construction of media institutions as privileged sites for accessing ‘our’ 
social ‘realities’, and the myths associated with that construction. So it is exactly from this 
reality claim that our framework for analysing reality media should start.  
 
Reality TV and the myth of the mediated center 
Media invest a lot of effort in reinforcing the legitimacy of their symbolic power ,4 or even 
better its naturalness - when they tell us that we must watch because everyone is watching 
(Big Brother, American Idol), when they tell us they know what a nation thinks (Daily Mail, 
New York Post). In English such claims are even condensed in language. As Todd Gitlin 
notes,5 we often slip the definite article in front of the word “media” – the media. But what 
object is referred to by this term? What is at stake in this language? 
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There are of course many media, and important contrasts between them; recognising that has 
never been more important, as media interfaces have proliferated in the past decade. But I 
highlight the term ‘the media’ in order to emphasise that this term’s apparent naturalness is 
part of a much larger, ongoing social construction whose relevance extends far beyond the 
vagaries of the English language. In my book Media Rituals I called this construction ‘the 
myth of the mediated centre’,6  by which I mean the claim that ‘the media’ are our privileged 
access-point to society’s centre or core. This myth enfolds another myth, ‘the myth of the 
centre’, the idea that ‘societies’, nations, have not just a physical or organizational centre – a 
place that allocates resources – but a centre in a different sense, a generative centre that 
explains the social world’s functioning and is the source of its values. In isolating this myth, I 
was attempting to extend an earlier analysis of media power ,7 and the highly dispersed 
processes whereby that power is legitimated, that in turn had drawn on late 20th century 
readings of power as pervasive and decentered (Foucault, Bourdieu, Actor Network Theory). 
The broad, seemingly ever-expanding phenomenon of ‘reality media’ can be productively 
analysed both as a site of media rituals8  and as an instantiation of the myth of the mediated 
center. Indeed that myth is a good starting-point for developing a framework for analysing 
comparatively how reality TV is embedded in institutional settings across the world. 
 
The mythical object - ‘the media’ – is not a trivial construction. Socially, it sounds like an 
answer to Durkheim’s question  about what bonds sustain a society as a society.9 Durkheim’s 
account of how social bonds are built through ritual has remarkable overlaps with how we 
have talked about ‘the media’ – as what everyone is watching, as the place where we all 
gather together.10 We must be wary of course of functionalism in our readings of society and 
media, yet  some version of that functionalism is a real force in everyday life, and that 
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discourse helps sustain media institutions (in all their particularity) as a site of general 
importance in our lives. Politically, the idea that media provide a representative space for a 
social ‘totality’ is crucial to how languages of politics in modernity have developed, since by 
this fiction, media can be treated as providing the means through which governments can 
plausibly assume they appear to ‘their’ populations, and their populations appear to them. 
This is not to claim media’s representational spaces are co-terminous with ‘our world’, or 
provide our only space of politics: it is the functionalism of such claims that I seek to avoid 
by emphasising the constructive work necessary to sustain the fiction of ‘the media’. In the 
economic domain, media’s role in focussing attention in particular directions, and the cultural 
work necessary to sustain this role, is relied upon not just by media industries (ratings) but by 
marketing industries generally. This is part of the cultural supplement to political economy 
explanations of media power; in times of economic instability, particularly in media markets, 
it is even more important that we think about how this cultural supplement works in tandem 
with economic pressures.  
 
In these interlocking domains (social, political, economic), then, a great deal is at stake in 
‘the media’s’ claimed ability to make populations appear, and to make a ‘world-in-common’ 
appear to populations. The emergence and continuity of reality TV as a social form needs, I 
suggest, to be interpreted as part of this process. But this process is itself subject currently to 
various complex transformations to which I now turn. 
 
Challenges to the myth of the mediated centre 
If reality TV should be first understood as part of a wider construction of ‘the media’ as 
socially central, it is necessarily caught up on the tensions to which the myth of the mediated 
centre is now subject. Those tensions require ever more work if that myth is to be sustained.  
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Socially, if the claim of ‘liveness’ was an essential component in the construction of ‘the 
media’ as socially central11 because ‘liveness’ captures our sense that we must switch on 
centrally transmitted media to check ‘what’s going on’, then we must note how new forms of 
‘liveness’ are emerging through online interfaces and mobile media that are primarily 
interpersonal and so potentially more continuous than mass media have ever been.12 Is there 
emerging a sense of social ‘liveness’ – mediated, yes, but not by central media institutions? 
Manuel Castells’ and his co-authors suggest that a new ‘mobile youth culture’ is emerging 
that helps young people ‘set up their own connections, bypassing the mass media’. 13So will 
interpersonal media become people’s primary mode of connection, with ‘the media’ 
increasingly incidental to our checks on what our friends are up to? Will this challenge our 
notion of media as socially central? This is unlikely but, to see why, we need to consider 
some other dimensions.  
 
Politically, the remarkable events of Barack Obama’s 2008 election should not allow us to 
forget the more pessimistic narratives in recent decades about the declining trend of 
engagement in mainstream politics, in many countries including the USA (Pharr and Putnam 
2000).14 Outside of the USA, where voter turnout rose in 2008, the broader context – longer-
term fears in some countries that turnout, particularly among the under 25s, will stabilise 
below or close to 50%15 - provide a troubling context for considering whether governments 
will be able in future to assume that media provide an effective means for making ‘their’ 
populations appear and for them to reach those populations. Although the Obama campaign 
did tap into social networking sites for political mobilisation, and benefited from huge 
attention from mainstream media also, the question for the future is whether, in less 
exceptional circumstances, governments will be able to use these extra-media focuses of 
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social attention as sites for reaching populations: Barack Obama’s one million ‘friends’ on 
Facebook may prove an exception, not the norm.  
 
In the economic domain, the uncertainty is of a different nature. As the search for advertising 
audiences intensifies, marketers are already using the counter-space of social networking sites 
as an important alternative to television for reaching consumers: media institutions from the 
BBC and NBC to music majors to commercial brands are all building profiles in social 
networking sites to create a ‘buzz’ about bands, products and programmes. Consistently with 
the above analysis, falling advertising revenues have generated a cultural response, that is an 
attempt to renegotiate where and how ‘we’ must focus our attention. Long-term, I suspect, 
new interpersonal media, far from being divorced from centrally produced media flows, will 
become increasingly intertwined with them in a sort of double helix. There is a complication, 
for sure, since this dynamic – the attempt to recreate the general pull of fashion in new ways - 
will interact with a competing dynamic (whose source is also intensified economic 
competition): the pressure to narrowcast audiences and to obtain their loyalty by 
differentiating consumers’ needs and performance (what Joseph Turow has recently called 
‘niche envy’).16 We cannot be sure how these contradictory economic pressures (aggregating 
and disaggregating) will play out. But the aggregating pressures condensed in the 
construction of ‘the media’ are likely to remain an important part of the mix for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
A potential comparative frame 
So far I have argued that reality TV is best seen as part of a much wider process that I have 
called ‘the myth of the mediated center’. By examining the tensions to which that myth is 
now subject, at least in particular territories, I have brought out how this broad analytic 
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framework allows us to get a broader perspective – that links social, economic and political 
dynamics – on how reality TV’s claims have come to matter. Clearly my account of the myth 
of the mediated center and its tensions, formulated above in terms shaped by media’s role in 
Europe and North America, remains a hypothesis to be tested and possibly reformulated 
afresh for other parts of the world. No assumption is made here that such tensions are 
universal: Indian and Chinese media/advertising markets, for example, are (subject to the 
current economic downturn) in a phase of long-term growth, leading to the possibility that in 
those countries ‘the myth of the mediated centre’ may, in relation to a large proportion of the 
population, be digitally enhanced from the outset. Nor, of course, can we assume there is one 
form of modernity or ignore the highly particular ways in which, for example, histories of 
state formation or the institutionalisation of religion have shaped modernity in different 
places, and media’s varying role within  such processes.  
 
I will return more explicitly at the end to the comparative implications of this long-term 
framing of the phenomenon of reality TV. I want first to turn to some other dynamics of 
reality TV that are more directly contingent. Under this category, I will deliberately, if 
provocatively, include neoliberalism, sometimes discussed as if it was universal. 
 
Contingencies 
 
If the continuing pressure to sustain media institutions’ status as a privileged access-point to 
‘what’s going on’ is, I would suggest, a feature of all states where media institutions have 
been an important feature of modernity – with reality TV one clear form for working through 
that long-term pressure - there is still a great deal to say about the particular pressures that 
have encouraged this form, this particular ‘solution’, to that broader problem. Here is where I 
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rejoin other accounts of reality TV, since there is something like consensus on some of the 
key factors.  
 
The economics of form 
Few would disagree that economic factors were crucial to the initial emergence of reality TV. 
While similar factors affected many countries ,17 in the UK growing competition in the 
television market with satellite and cable expansion, alongside the Thatcher government’s 
pressure on public broadcasting to cut costs and operate more ‘commercially’ (the Peacock 
Report), quite obviously favoured program forms that were cheap, yet in economic 
(audience) terms sustainable. Even if the idea of presenting so-called ‘ordinary people’ (that 
is, those outside media institutions)18 as actors had its source in a longer documentary 
tradition and, quite plausibly, in rising tensions about the representative authority of ‘the 
media’ themselves, the economic advantages of early reality TV formats were of overriding 
importance.19  
 
The ways in which such basic economic pressures translated into formal patterns has, 
however, particular interest.20 Because the point of reality TV is to attract regular audience 
attention for non-professional performers, but without the expense of a formal plot, it needs a 
temporal structure targeted at ‘events’ which ‘cannot’ be missed. It is not accidental that 
reality programmes which a few years ago tried to narrativise observation (observing staff at 
an airport, a hotel, and so on) have in part been replaced by programmes that, as John Corner 
puts it,21 ‘build their own social’ - within event-structures constructed for the purpose (Big 
Brother, Survivor, American Idol). Those event-structures require critical moments – how 
better to generate these than through judging behaviour between characters, who thus become 
‘contestants’? (Clearly there are older lineages of popular culture – the singing contest, the 
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talent show22 - to draw on here.) This in turn requires recognizable forms of authority through 
which decisions are ratified. In reality TV, media draw on various external forms of authority 
in order to fill out their wider authority to present ‘the social’: the psychologist as judge of 
the ‘facts’ of general human nature, the industry expert (music producers, professional chefs 
and so on) as judges of skill. The economic advantages of game-like structures (as ways of 
generating events based on judgements) have further consequences: game-based forms shield 
media’s underlying claim to social knowledge from direct criticism (it’s only a game!), and 
guarantee a structure whose detailed rules are difficult to challenge (if you’re playing the 
game!). It is rare for contestants explicitly and publicly to challenge the rules of reality TV 
and those who do get treated harshly. In the UK Big Brother’s third series one contestant 
reacted to the tedium of the house, quite rationally you might have thought, by reading a book 
in the bedroom – he got voted off and heavily criticised in public for this by the show’s 
presenter (29 and 31 May 2002).  
 
Teaching and judging ‘reality’ in the UK 
Various pressures then (above all economic) encouraged particular resolutions of the problem 
of how to embody media  institutions’ authority and make populations ‘appear’ in new 
popular entertainment formats.  But equally important are the factors favoring particular 
inflections of the basic forms of reality tv as meaningful. I want to resist the temptation to 
reduce all such content-related factors to just one, neoliberalism, for reasons that will become 
clear later on. My discussion will focus on the UK.  
 
In the UK (and perhaps other countries) an important factor behind the growth of reality tv 
may be not so much neoliberalism, as the growing opacity of the social world. Individuals, if 
we follow Axel Honneth’s recent analysis, operate in a social world with fewer clear signals 
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about values, more incitements to mark themselves off from others through consumption, and 
increasingly abstract measures of their “performance” – a conflict that Honneth claims is 
‘making [individual] lives into fiction’.23 The ‘fiction’ that results from this gap between 
people’s lives and the narratives available for making sense of them is, arguably, filled 
through reality TV’s various forms of instruction and guidance. This incitement towards 
‘instruction’ is inflected, without doubt, by wider features of UK society, particularly its 
growing inequality and indeed inhospitability as a place for receiving instruction! If we 
exclude housing, the top 10%’s share of UK national wealth increased (by more than 20%) to 
71% between 1986 and 2003, while in terms of income the UK top 10%’s purchasing power 
is nearly 14 times more than that of the bottom 10%  (this is according to the UNDP’s 
comparative figures); the latter figures suggest the UK is twice as unequal as Germany and 
Sweden and three times more unequal than Japan (in the US however the multiple was nearly 
16). That opaque and increasingly unequal world is one that has provided poor conditions for 
young people as they grow up. A much cited 2007 UNICEF report on child well-being placed 
the UK bottom out of 21 rich countries and identified the UK as one of only 2 countries 
where less than 50% of children found their peers ‘kind and helpful’.24  
 
Underlying pressures towards formats where ‘ordinary people’ compete at everyday tasks 
have in the UK intersected with an older tradition of media’s pedagogic authority (one of the 
staples of the Reithian BBC): from television in the UK we can learn not only how to cook or 
undergo ‘extreme adventures’ but also how to decorate our rooms, move house, go on a date, 
even see potential criminals learn what prison is ‘really like’ (Banged Up, Channel 5 2008). 
This last example illustrates how such pedagogy is often purely vicarious: one is encouraged 
to watch others very distant from oneself undergo a pedagogic experience before the hybrid 
authority of television. Note also the equally bizarre Fast Food Junkies Go Native Channel 4 
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2008, which took overweight people to remote rural Pakistan to experience the local diet and 
work routine. In the UK , such reality-based pedagogy has become an arena where barely 
disguised judgements of class have become acceptable again,25 notwithstanding Tony Blair’s 
vision of a ‘classless society’. 
 
Political irony aside, what is most striking about this new popular version of ‘the media’s’ 
social and pedagogic authority is how it works, not through impersonal instruction delivered 
to an unseen and anonymous audience (as in cooking and gardening programmes till the 
1980s), but through judgements meted out in public on the bodies of ‘ordinary people’ in all 
their particularity and vulnerability. While aspects of this process are specific to the UK’s 
tortured class politics, the USA for example shares the increase in inequality in recent 
decasdes and, as Ouellette and Hay  demonstrate,26 offers many examples of pedagogy 
through ‘reality-based’ media judgement. 
 
Neoliberalism 
It is only at this point in exploring the dynamics of reality TV that we need to consider what 
impact neoliberalism has had. By neoliberalism here I mean the complex of forces – 
discursive/ economic/ organisational/ political - which have converged to sustain a view of 
the social world that gives absolute priority (in terms of explanation, organisation and values) 
to the market,27 and have therefore helped marketise social space and the relations between 
government and governed. This does not,  whatever the rhetoric, involve a simply withdrawal 
of the state from social space, but on the contrary the installation as common sense of new 
principles of organisation that Rose calls ‘degovernmentalisation’ (1996), because it involves 
forms of power that seek, so far as possible, not to rely on the explicit orders of the state .28 
An analogous process has been under way in the corporate domain whereby power in 
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corporate settings is displaced in new forms of ‘self-management’ that, because of the norms 
they entrench, are wholly consistent with the increasing arbitrariness and violence of 
authority’s actual operations .29  
 
Take the UK version of The Apprentice where the US show’s Donald Trump is replaced by 
the abrasive working class entrepreneur Sir Alan Sugar.  Here the most important rule is that 
Sir Alan Sugar’s personal authority overrides everything else;30 indeed contestants show 
character by submitting to that authority in all its arbitrariness. A clear illustration came 
towards the end of Series 2 when Sir Alan confronted Paul (who had been on the winning 
team in every previous task and so hadn’t yet appeared to defend himself before Sir Alan in 
the programme’s ‘Boardroom’). Here’s Sir Alan: ‘the fact that you’ve won all the tasks 
doesn’t mean jack shit to me because I haven’t talked with you yet. So you speak to me now, 
you speak to me now, because, I’m telling you, it’s getting close to that door.’ So the 
message was clear – playing by the rules, doing all the approved tasks, counts for nothing, 
unless you have proven yourself in front of Sir Alan. This rule fits rather well with working 
conditions in those neoliberal democracies where, as Richard Sennett ,31 corporate authority 
is increasingly personalised and charismatic. The argument can be extended to shows such as 
Big Brother, where the arbitrary authority and compulsory emotional labour of today’s 
workplaces is translated, in disguised form, into the rules of harmless play, within what I 
have called a ‘secret theatre’.32  
 
There is no doubt a strong case for the convergence in the UK and USA between wider social 
and economic regulation under neoliberalism and reality show formats  (,33 with US shows 
offering a clear case of television ‘filling out’ domains of social instruction and guidance 
from which federal governments have withdrawn, telling citizens to rely on self-discipline. 
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Neoliberalism is not, however, a master-narrative for understanding reality TV. Reality TV is 
better seen as a site where the authority of ‘the media’ – their distinctive claim, however 
playful, to give us a privileged access to the social world – is doing work, in alliance with 
other types of authority, to present the social world in a consistent way: as a place where the 
complexity of people’s experiences and motives is easily reducible to rules; where one key 
rule is that submission to continuous surveillance34  and the judgement of external authority 
is necessary for ‘self-improvement’ or self-development. The result is a new form of 
mediated authority, enacted in public, in which not just neoliberalism but multiple 
overlapping factors  - of varying sorts and temporalities, economic, social and political – 
converge. This causal complexity suggests that reality TV is not just a format, but something 
more like what the great German sociologist Norbert Elias called a ‘figuration’ which in 
highly condensed form enacts, through the bodies and judgements of individuals, the 
outcome of many types of mutual dependency and pressure.35 So far all I have done is 
recharacterise an emerging consensus about the deeper social and political implications of 
reality TV’s particular way of making populations appear, particularly among North 
American and European writers. But it is clear we can’t stop the story here. 
 
Complications 
 
There are two types of factor which require us to complicate the story told so far: first, 
international comparison; second, the site of the audience. 
 
Marwan Kraidy’s work36  has brought out how in the Middle East, with its distinctive 
constellation of media, political and social authority, reality TV becomes an important site for 
rearticulating issues of national identity and religious authority, while neoliberalism, for 
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example, is rarely directly relevant as a frame of analysis. Indeed we would expect the stakes 
in an overdetermined figuration such as reality TV to vary from place to place (Elias was one 
of the classical sociologists most committed to comparative analysis). Comparative research 
into reality TV requires the largest possible set of reference-points and framing reality tv as 
part of a wider social conflict over the construction of ‘the media’ provides this. Within this 
broader frame, we can expect a number of possibilities: 
 
1. cases where the very construction of ‘the media’ is interpreted not consensually, 
but as acting against alternative constructions of society’s ‘centre’ (for example, 
religion or secular authoritarian power); 
2. variations in the range of forces competing over ‘the media’ (in some places 
religious organisations, in others competing political forces, in still others competing 
models of economic organisation); 
3. cases where the territory over which a given reality tv form circulates does not 
match with the boundaries of political or state power (the Middle East with its 
regional television flows being a key example), creating obvious conflicts of 
authority; 
4. variations in the degree to which the act of becoming visible in media  as an 
‘ordinary person’ (essential to reality tv) is itself socially regulated or constrained for 
particular groups, for example women or ethnic minorities.  
 
To the extent that in any location one of these axes coincides with wider social or political 
faultlines, then we would expect that a discourse dominant elsewhere (such as neoliberalism) 
will not be the primary reference-frame for reality TV in that location, even before we 
consider the uneven global circulation of neoliberal discourse itself. In addition, there may be 
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uncertainties whether ‘the myth of the mediated center’ has been successfully constructed at 
all in a particular location, or, even if it has, whether it is now subject to collapse (a more 
radical version of the tensions discussed earlier). These are the sorts of possibilities that a 
comparative analysis of reality TV could hope to explore. 
  
The second complicating factor is what, for shorthand, we can still call the ‘audience’. My 
point is not the banal one that analysing the effectivity of texts requires an account of 
audiences’ possibilities of resistant interpretation. The default assumption that audience 
‘decoding’ is a site of freedom has long been exploded.37 Texts become embedded in action, 
thought and belief - with significant implications for power - far beyond any initial act of 
‘reading’, and a key aim of analysing reality TV and other ‘media rituals’ was to highlight 
this point. My point instead is that, in so far as media forms such as reality tv carry traces of 
wider contests over authority and power, we need to find out rather more than we currently 
know about how those forms get embedded in everyday life. Do traces of neoliberal models 
of self-government in a reality show get circulated in forms of everyday talk (‘the 
Apprentice’ as office joke?) or in individual forms of playful acting-out? What forms of 
informal collective play (for example the exchange of comments and opinions at the climax 
of a show such as American Idol) are now common?  But reality tv formats may also be 
embedded in quite different ways, for example in the form of crisis, as where reality tv 
formats have attracted political or religious attention in Brazil, the Middle East or Southern 
Africa.38 At this point, we come face-to-face with a larger difficulty for comparative media 
analysis, which is the lack of work to date on how to compare ‘media cultures’ rigorously 
(Hepp and Couldry forthcoming), a topic with which I have no space to deal here.  
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It is important therefore that our accounts of reality tv do not close down the possible 
complexities of  how cultural formations around reality TV work. Here the overwhelming 
emphasis of governmentality approaches such as Ouelette and Hay’s on discourse runs into 
some difficulties. Their excellent deconstruction (following Foucault and Rose) of US reality 
tv only talks about the action of reality TV’s discourses on US society, as if social space itself 
was simply a plane of discourse. Their language for describing television – as ‘everyday 
technologies of the self’,39 as ‘an integral relay within the entrepreneurial network of welfare 
provision and private social support’40 – offers precious little scope for asking the crucial 
question: how, by whom, under what circumstances and to what practical ends does such 
pedagogy get accepted and internalised? To write, as they do, that ‘television’s lasting value 
may have to do with its rootedness in daily life, as a serialised framework for personal 
regimes’41 only indicates the site of the problem, not the answer. In this, they risk repeating 
the explanatory foreshortening in Nikolas Rose’s work, when he depicts ‘mass media’ as 
merely one among ‘a plethora of indirect mechanisms that can translate the goals of political, 
social, economic authorities into the choices and commitments of individuals, locating them 
[citizens] into actual or virtual networks of identification through which they may be 
governed’.42 This notion of ‘translation’ ignores the question: through what mechanism 
exactly is it that individuals are ‘formed’, indeed reformed, as subjects?43 It is here that the 
reference-point of the myth of the mediated centre – related on the macro-level to media’s 
widest claims to social authority and on the micro-level to the minutiae of media’s 
ritualization – can complement governmentality accounts to broaden our understanding of 
how reality Tv works in ‘society’.  
 
Conclusion 
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The subject of reality TV is complex and multidimensional, and our understanding of it no 
doubt still incomplete. This chapter has reflected on how best to frame reality TV, as we enter 
the age of more seriously comparative international research.44  Unhelpful is any account 
which reduces reality TV to the operations of one causal dimension, whether of discourse (for 
example ‘neoliberal discourse’) or the economy, expression of national community, or 
television history. Reality TV is everywhere a multidimensional (social, political, economic 
and cultural) process, whose variations need to be understood within a comparative frame 
that recognises this complexity.  
 
Our analysis also needs to be in touch with media’s broader claims to present social ‘reality’ 
within the various forms that modernity has taken; ‘reality media’ as an  example of those 
claims has has significant political implications. The claim of particular media institutions 
anywhere to present central social ‘realities’ will always be clothed in language that is 
variable, often ironic, perhaps discounted by those who encounter it, and multiply 
determined. But just as the claim to present ‘reality’ is not trivial, neither are the stakes 
involved in such claims trivial, since behind them lies a contest of wider long-term 
significance: the continual struggle within modernity to make populations appear, whether to 
governments, markets or to themselves, and so help sustain the plausibility of key 
assumptions on which modern politics, economies and societies depend.  
 
That is why I suggest we analyse reality TV as first, but not only, an example of media 
institutions’ attempts to claim social authority for themselves, and other institutions’ practices 
of underwriting or buying into such claims. Such processes will play out very differently in 
different locations, and this variation is something a fully international media studies must 
explore, along the axes of comparison mentioned above and no doubt more. The modest aim 
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of this chapter has been to provide a framework within such comparative work might 
develop. 
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